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Budgetary pressures on the Social Security system have in­
creased in recent years, prompting a variety of proposals to restruc­
ture the U.S. retirement income program. Most of these proposals 
ignore the possibility that the retirement patterns of older workers 
are likely to respond to changes in the incentives to retire. This 
chapter presents two important pieces of information for policy­
makers. First, we provide previously unavailable evidence on how 
changes in the structure of Social Security benefits would alter the 
economic incentives to retire at different ages. Second, we compute 
how retirement patterns would change in response to altered incen­
tives to work at later ages.1
The first section, below, outlines the present structure of So­
cial Security and indicates how benefits will change if a worker post­
pones retirement to a later age. The second section addresses the 
question of how proposed reforms would alter the structure of 
Social Security benefits. The third section poses the question: How 
do retirement ages depend on Social Security, private pension 
benefits, and earnings? To answer this question we estimate retire­
ment parameters using data from the Longitudinal Retirement 
History Survey. The fourth section then employs these estimates 
to evaluate how retirement ages might be expected to change if 
the various Social Security reforms described above were to be im­
plemented. The last section summarizes the policy implications 
of our research.
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THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
This section examines the Social Security components of the 
older worker’s income opportunity set. Our goals here are to quan­
tify initial retirement benefits and to explore how benefits increase 
as retirement is postponed.
The formulas we describe below are for a worker who turned 
60 on January 1, 1982, because the sample we worked with was con­
structed for people who reached 62 in 1982. The formulas are simi­
lar but not identical for people born in other years.2
Social Security Benefit Determination for a Worker Retiring in 1982
The Social Security Administration has changed its benefit 
formulas many times over the years. The current system, for all its 
complexity, is a much more streamlined structure than was the case 
previously. There are three steps used in computing how much an 
eligible worker will receive in annual Social Security benefits (ex­
plained in detail below). First, the Social Security Administration 
summarizes each worker’s lifetime earnings by computing a number 
known as the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). Second, 
a formula is applied to this earnings measure to come up with the 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). Third and finally, the Social 
Security Administration determines the individual’s actual benefits 
based on the Primary Insurance Amount and the age at which he or 
she files for Social Security benefits. Throughout this paper, we call 
this the “age of retirement.”
Step 1: Computing the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
In order to determine a worker’s AIME, the Social Security 
office compiles annual earnings (up to the Social Security tax ceiling) 
for each year between 1951 and the year of retirement. The earnings 
record up to age 60 must then be converted to inflation-adjusted or 
real dollars, by dividing through by a wage index devised by the So­
cial Security Administration. For a worker who turned age 60 in 
1982, the 28 years of highest earnings are then averaged. The final 
product of this calculation, in monthly terms, is the AIME.
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Step 2: Computing the Primary Insurance Amount
A worker’s Primary Insurance Amount is determined by a com­
plex formula based on the AIME. The higher a worker’s AIME, the 
higher the PIA.
Step 3: Computing the Worker’s Annual Benefit Amount
The final step in determining Social Security benefits involves 
computing an individual’s retirement benefits as a function of the 
PIA and age of retirement. In general, no benefits are provided at 
ages younger than 62, so that the benefit received is zero until age 
62 for a worker who leaves the work force at ages 60 and 61. In 
the case of a worker filing for benefits between ages 62 and 64, 
the government applies an early retirement reduction factor, so that 
the PIA is reduced by 6.67 percent for every year under age 65. For 
instance, someone retiring at age 62 would receive the PIA times a 
multiple of 80 percent (or .80), computed by multiplying 6.67 
percent times three years.
Benefits for a 65-year-old retiree are exactly equal to the PIA, 
so the multiple applied at age 65 is effectively 100 percent (or 1.0). 
A worker waiting to retire until after age 65 receives a delayed retire­
ment credit, which increases the PIA multiple by 3 percent for each 
year after age 65.3 For example, someone retiring at age 68 receives 
a Social Security benefit that is 109 percent of (or 1.09 times) his 
or her PIA.
The preceding calculations refer to a retiree’s first-year benefits. 
In subsequent years, benefits increase with inflation.
Social Security Benefit Determination for a Worker 
Deferring Retirement Until After 1982
A worker who is eligible to retire but postpones retirement will 
receive higher Social Security benefits when he or she eventually 
leaves the labor force. This occurs for several reasons. First, current 
regulations allow earnings after age 60 to replace lower-earnings 
years in the AIME computations described above. Since the Social 
Security earnings ceiling has increased rapidly in the last decade, 
income earned later in life will raise Average Indexed Monthly
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Earnings. In addition, earnings after age 60 are not divided by the 
wage-indexation series. Consequently, an individual receiving wage 
increases due to an inflation adjustment will have a higher monthly 
earnings figure and thus higher benefits.
When earnings increase in this way, the worker’s PIA will also 
rise using the formula given above. In addition, a higher earnings 
figure also entitles the worker’s spouse to higher benefits, if the 
spouse receives benefits based on the primary worker’s record.4 
When there is no spouse, or the spouse receives benefits based on 
his or her own earnings, this effect is not relevant.
Finally, when a worker postpones retirement, the multiple 
used to compute benefits will rise with age.
It is instructive to examine the expected payoff to postponed 
retirement for an “illustrative worker,” whom we take to be the 
average (mean) individual from a representative sample of older 
workers surveyed in the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey 
(LRHS). This survey was first developed by the Social Security Ad­
ministration in 1969, and provides socioeconomic information for 
each respondent as well as a summary of earnings records taken from 
Social Security files beginning in 1951. Using this data set as a base, 
we updated average earnings to the present, to reflect what an older 
worker in the 1980s might be expected to earn if he or she continued 
to work. Our updating procedure assumed that older workers par­
ticipated in economy-wide changes in real (inflation-adjusted) 
earnings over time.
For each possible retirement age between ages 60 and 68, 
Social Security benefits were computed for a typical worker by first 
determining the individual’s AIME in 1982 dollars, computing the 
PIA as described above, and then applying the multiples appropriate 
for the age in question.5 For ages 60 and 61 we assume that the 
worker leaving employment would file for benefits as soon as he or 
she is eligible (i.e., at age 62). Between ages 62 and 68, benefit 
amounts are determined assuming that the individual files in the year 
he or she retires.6
The first row of Table 12.1 presents annual Social Security 
benefits in 1982 dollars for the illustrative worker at alternative re­
tirement ages. Annual benefits are around $5,400 for the earliest 
possible retirement age, rising to a peak of about $7,900 if the 
worker defers retirement until age 68. The rate of benefit increases 
varies markedly across different ages; yearly benefits grow rapidly as
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Table 12.1. Social Security Payments When Retirement Is Postponed: The 
Current Structure of Individual Benefits for the “Illustrative Worker”
Retirement Age:
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
Annual Social 
Security Benefits
$5,378* 5,401* 5,456 5,964 6,481 7,017 7,307 7,605 7,610
Present Value of 
Total Social 
Security Benefits
$67,402 67,697 68,387 69,242 69,515 69,341 66,311 63,173 59,928
All figures are expressed in real 1982 dollars.
* These are the benefits the illustrative individual would receive if he or she 
filed for benefits at age 62 but retired at the age indicated.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
retirement is deferred from age 60 to age 65 as a result of increasing 
earnings as well as the PIA multiple. At older ages, the additional 
benefit from postponing retirement is far less, because the late retire­
ment credit after age 65 (3 percent per year) is less than the early 
retirement reduction factor before age 65 (6.67 percent per year).
Although annual benefits rise when retirement is postponed, the 
individual has fewer years in which to collect Social Security benefits. 
It is therefore interesting to compute the present value of benefits, 
or the cumulative worth of total future benefits after adjusting for 
inflation, mortality, and preference for income sooner rather than 
later.7 The second row of Table 12.1 displays these accumulations as 
viewed from age 60 for the illustrative workers. As we see, the pres­
ent value of Social Security benefits for an age-62 retiree is on the 
order of $68,000, while if the same individual waited until age 64 
to retire, the cumulative worth of Social Security payments grows to 
almost $70,000. Evidently there is a reward of close to $2,000 as 
the worker defers retirement from the earliest possible age to the 
mid-sixties; but beyond this age, Social Security lifetime benefits 
fall rapidly. In fact, the present value of benefits at age 68 is only 
about 90 percent of what the age-60 retiree would have received. In 
this way, the current system rewards retirement before age 65, and 
actually penalizes those workers who would like to remain on the 
job until later ages.
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RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL SECURITY
Several different policies have been suggested to alter the 
pattern of Social Security benefits, in the expectation that they 
might relieve some of the system’s more serious financing difficulties. 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate whether and how restruc­
turing benefit formulas would alter retirement incentives, both in 
terms of annual payoffs and according to the present value of life­
time benefit streams.
The Experiments
Five specific methods of altering Social Security benefits are 
considered, which span a wide range of suggestions under current 
policy review. These are:
A. Increasing the normal retirement age
B. Changing the early retirement credit
C. Increasing the late retirement credit
D. Increasing the gain for retiring later
E. Raising benefits in steps
Experiment A
Increasing the normal retirement age means, in practical terms, 
that the individual would receive his or her full Primary Insurance 
Amount at age 68 rather than at age 65, as currently is the case. 
This is achieved by altering PIA multiples to provide full benefits at 
the new normal age (68) and smaller multiples for retirement prior to 
68. The functional relationship between AIME and PIA remains 
unchanged.
Experiment B
Changing the early retirement reduction factor implies that 
annual benefits would be determined by applying a lower multiple 
for retirees filing for Social Security before age 65. For instance, the 
62-year-old would receive .55 times his or her PIA, rather than .80, 
as at present. This multiple would increase to 1.00 at age 65, as now.
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In this experiment, the gain is raised for deferring early retirement, 
while the late retirement credit is left unchanged.
Experiment C
Increasing the late retirement credit might be accomplished by 
increasing only the multiple for those who defer retirement beyond 
65, and using the same multiples for retirement prior to age 65. The 
worker waiting until age 68 to retire would then receive 1.2 times his 
or her PIA, in contrast to the current, lower multiple 1.09.
Experiment D
Increasing the gain for retiring later both lowers the benefit 
from early retirement and raises the benefit from late retirement. 
The multiple for age 62 retirees becomes .55, rising to 1.0 at age 65, 
and then rising further to 1.20 at age 68. Therefore this plan provides 
the largest combined payoff in terms of increases in annual benefits 
for those who defer retirement.
Experiment E
Raising benefits in steps applies the same early retirement re­
duction factor to all retirees between the ages of 62 and 64 years, 11 
months, so that each of these individuals would receive a benefit 
amount equal to their PIA times .80. From ages 65 to 67 and 11 
months a multiple of 1.00 would be applied. For age 68 and later 
ages, the multiple would be increased to 1.09, which is where the 
current age 68 multiple stands. This experiment thus replicates the 
current system of multiples for ages 62, 65, and 68, but imposes a 
step function for PIA multiples in between.
Effects of the Five Experiments on Social Security Benefits
Table 12.2 presents how each of the five experiments would 
alter the Social Security benefits available to the illustrative worker 
described above. Annual amounts are listed in the top half, and pres­
ent values of these streams are found in the bottom half.
Table 12.2. Effects of Five Experiments on Social Security Benefits for the “Illustrative Worker”
Retirement Age
60* 61* 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
ANNUAL SS BENEFITS:
Status Quo S5.378 5,401 5,456 5,964 6,481 7,017 7,307 7,605 7,910
Experiment A 4,034 4,052 4,093 4,588 5,092 5,614 6,148 6,696 7,256
Experiment B 3,698 3,714 3,752 4,818 5,903 7,017 7,307 7,605 7,910
Experiment C 5,379 5,402 5,457 5,965 6,481 7,017 7,567 8,131 8,707
Experiment D 3,698 3,714 3,752 4,918 5,903 7,017 7,567 8,131 8,707
Experiment E 5,379 5,402 5,457 5,506 5,555 7,107 7,094 7,174 7,909
PRESENT VALUE OF 
TOTAL SS BENEFITS
Status Quo $67,402 67,697 68,387 69,242 69,515 69,341 66,311 63,173 59,928
Experiment A 50,566 50,783 51,300 53,275 54,624 55,474 55,798 55,621 54,974
Experiment B 46,352 46,551 47,025 55,936 63,316 69,342 66,311 63,172 59,922
Experiment C 67,421 67,711 68,399 69,256 69,521 69,342 68,674 67,540 65,969
Experiment D 46,352 46,551 47,025 55,936 63,316 69,342 68,674 67,540 65,969
Experiment E 67,421 67,711 68,399 63,926 59,592 69,342 64,380 59,596 59,922
The figures are benefits computed for single individuals. Spouses’ benefits remain constant, since they are calculated from the 
primary earners’ PIA, which does not change in these five experiments. All figures are expressed in real 1982 dollars.
*Annual benefits are the amounts the illustrative individual would receive if he or she filed for benefits at age 62 but retired at 
the age indicated.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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In the three experiments that lower retirement benefits at early 
ages (Experiments A, B, and D), we find that the present value of 
Social Security benefits has changed significantly. Here benefits rise a 
great deal if a worker defers retirement from age 60 to 65, in con­
trast to the status quo, where it changes very little for that age range.
Turning to post-65 benefits, we find that the present value of 
Social Security benefits always falls after age 65, even when the late 
retirement credit is raised (Experiments C and D). Experiment E has 
the effect of lowering the cumulative value of Social Security bene­
fits relative to the status quo at ages 63 and 64, and again at ages 66 
and 67. Consequently, none of these policies actively encourages 
continued work beyond age 65.
The resultant patterns are of three different shapes. Under the 
status quo and Experiment C, the total Social Security benefit value 
rises slightly until age 65, where it turns down. Under Experiments 
A, B, and D, the pattern is an inverted U-shape. Finally, in Experi­
ment E, the present value of benefits is level until age 62, then falls 
until age 65, rises sharply at age 65, and then falls again thereafter.
THE DETERMINANTS OF RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR
Our analytical framework posits that older workers decide when 
to retire on the basis of two sets of factors: (1) their preferences for 
the income they gain from work versus the extra leisure they enjoy if 
they retire, and (2) the amount of extra income they get if they post­
pone retirement.8 The income from postponing retirement is com­
posed of earnings, private pensions, and Social Security. This is not 
meant to imply that monetary factors are the only considerations 
that enter into the retirement decision; we recognize that factors 
such as health, occupation, family situation, and many others affect 
retirement behavior as well. These other factors are incorporated into 
an older worker’s preferences and/or income opportunities.
Estimating the determinants of retirement behavior requires 
that two kinds of information be available for each older worker: 
(a) the income and leisure opportunities that would have been avail­
able at alternative retirement ages, and (b) the actual retirement age 
chosen. These data requirements are particularly stringent, and no 
publicly available data set contains exactly what is needed. However,
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we use a subset of white married males from the Longitudinal Re­
tirement History Survey (LRHS), mentioned earlier, to derive the 
most critical information.
To gauge the determinants of older workers’ choices of retire­
ment ages, we used a new statistical technique known as Ordered 
Logit. This technique produces maximum likelihood estimates of the 
effects of earnings, pensions, Social Security, and leisure on age of 
retirement. Having obtained these estimates, we use them to predict 
how each older worker in our sample would respond if presented 
with the five Social Security reform experiments described above. 
The results are discussed in the next section.
RESTRUCTURING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.
HOW WILL RETIREMENT AGES RESPOND?
Developing a Budget Set for Current Workers
Before we can predict how today’s older workers would re­
spond to changes in the structure of Social Security benefits, we 
need to develop an idea of what retirement patterns are likely to be 
for workers facing the current benefits structure. This will serve as a 
baseline in examining the five policy experiments.
The budget set used for this step of the analysis builds on the 
LRHS data set, which contains evidence on retirement behavior 
from the early 1970s. Of course, there has been much inflation since 
then, and earnings were adjusted accordingly.
Another important difference between income opportunities 
in the 1970s and the 1980s is that Social Security rules have changed 
rather markedly. Lifetime benefits available under the current Social 
Security regulations are determined as discussed in the second 
section of this chapter, above. Another important difference is that 
life expectancies have changed among older persons; higher current 
survival probabilities were used in deriving the present value of life­
time benefits to workers alive today.
To evaluate how retirement age distributions might differ under 
the five policy experiments, we developed data on workers’ total in­
come opportunities under the alternative scenarios and simulated the 
resultant retirement patterns. Incorporating the Social Security bene­
fit modifications described in the second section shows that Experi­
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ments A, B, and D lower the value of lifetime income substantially; 
this arises from the particular nature of the Social Security reforms in 
each case. Experiments B and D provide a much larger gain in income 
if the worker retires, as compared to the present system.
How Retirement Ages Would Respond to 
the New Structure of Social Security Benefits
Table 12.3 summarizes how retirement ages would be expected 
to change if workers were to be presented with the five alternative 
Social Security benefit structures outlined in this paper. We find that 
the estimated responses vary widely with the type of experiment per­
formed:
1. The largest responses are observed for Experiments B and D, 
both of which provide lower benefit amounts for all early retire­
ment ages and, in addition, reward continued work before age 65 
by the largest amounts. The response would be a delay of retire­
ment by three months.
2. The experiment that also lowers benefits but provides less incen­
tive to remain another year (Experiment A) has an intermediate 
impact on retirement patterns (one and a half months).
3. The smallest responses are obtained by increasing the late retire­
ment credit (Experiment C) or raising benefits in steps (Experi­
ment E), since these experiments change incentives in early 
retirement years the least, and most people retire before age 65. 
These responses are effectively zero.
Table 12.3. Impact of Restructuring Social Security: Anticipated Changes in 
Average Retirement Ages
Experiment
Effect of experiment on 
average retirement age 
in months
A: Increasing the normal retirement age 
B : Changing the early retirement reduction factor
+ 1.6 
+ 2.9 
+ 0.2 
+ 3.1 
+ 0.1
C: Increasing the late retirement credit
D: Increasing the gain for retiring later 
E: Raising benefits in steps
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
These response patterns suggest four policy implications:
1. Raising the late retirement credit would be ineffective in 
inducing later retirement. It is sometimes suggested that increasing 
the incentives for later retirement would be a way of inducing older 
workers to retire later. We estimate that such a policy would have 
only a minimal effect. This is because most older workers retire well 
before reaching age 65. In order to take advantage of a larger later 
retirement credit, they would have to retire after age 65. Thus, the 
typical worker would have to retire several years later if the late 
retirement credit is to pay off for him or her. He or she would be 
willing to do this only if the payoff were to become very much larger. 
However, raising the late retirement credit in the manner described 
here would not do this; rather, it would at best undo what is now a 
substantial penalty. As a result, we would not expect most workers 
to respond to a late retirement credit.
2.  Reducing early retirement benefits by changing the early 
retirement reduction factor would save the Social Security system 
money but hurt the average worker. The idea of reducing Social 
Security benefits at early ages while keeping the normal benefit at 
its present level is discussed in political circles from time to time. We 
estimate that reducing the age-62 benefit from 80 percent to 55 per­
cent of the normal benefit (and corresponding reductions for ages 
between 62 and 65) would increase retirement ages by an average of 
three months. Three months of extra work would not be enough to 
restore a typical retiree’s benefit to its previous level. As a result, the 
Social Security system would save money, but early retirees would 
end up poorer.
3. Increasing the normal retirement age while holding the early 
retirement age at 62 saves the Social Security system money, but 
hurts the average worker. In 1983, Congress decided to increase the 
normal retirement age for future generations of retirees. Our model 
simulated a reform quite similar to the one actually implemented: 
raising the normal retirement age from 65 to 68, while holding the 
early retirement age at 62 and maintaining an early retirement re­
duction factor of 6.67 percent per year. We conclude that this low­
ers retirement benefits at all retirement ages, early as well as late. 
This scheme increases retirement ages by an average of one and a
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half months, not enough to restore benefits to their previous levels. 
The Social Security system will save money, but early retirees will 
end up poorer.
4. I f  early retirement benefits are reduced by changing the early 
retirement reduction factor or by increasing the normal retirement 
age, people who cannot postpone early retirement will be hurt the 
most. Some older persons are more able than others to go on work­
ing if retirement incentives are changed. The people hardest hit by a 
reduction in early retirement benefits would be those who, by reason 
of ill health, loss of job, or other misfortune, do not find it viable to 
prolong their working lives. Penalizing early retirement imposes the 
heaviest burden on those least able to bear it.
In sum, the retirement responses estimated in this study are 
quite small—on the order of three months at the outside, for only 
one of the policy experiments. It must be concluded that the finan­
cial savings to the Social Security system generated by these policies 
would be the result of lower benefits paid out over approximately 
the same length of time, rather than payment of the same amount 
for a shorter period of time. If the reforms enacted in 1983 are in­
sufficient to attain financial solvency for the system, benefit levels at 
all retirement ages will probably have to be reduced. However, this 
may be most detrimental to those whose retirement options are the 
least flexible.
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NOTES
1. Changes like those described in this paper were implemented in the 
1983 round of amendments to the Social Security Act. For a comparison of the 
simulated and actual reforms, see Fields and Mitchell (1984).
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2. See the Social Security Handbook for current regulations and the 
Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement for a summary of changes 
over time (U.S. Dept, of Health and Human Services 1984, 1985).
3. The 3 percent figure pertains to all workers attaining age 62 in 1982 or 
later. Previously, the delayed retirement credit was 1 percent per year.
4. The spouse of a retired worker is eligible to receive benefits based on 
his or her own work record, and in addition can receive benefits based on the 
retired worker’s benefits as well, if these are greater. The spouse of a worker who 
retires at age 65 may receive as much as 50 percent of the retiring worker’s 
benefit. If the spouse is age 65, the spouse receives 50 percent of the benefit 
computed as though the worker had retired at age 65. If the spouse files for 
benefits prior to age 65 (as early as age 62), he or she will be entitled to a re­
duced benefit, to which an early retirement reduction factor applies.
5. Other retirement ages could be examined as well, but the range of 60 
to 68 covers the choices made by the vast majority of retirees.
6. Most older workers are not covered by private pensions, and have 
relatively little wealth at later ages; thus, labor force withdrawal tends to co­
incide with filing for benefits in the vast majority of cases, although it is tech­
nically possible to withdraw from the labor force at some earlier age and yet 
defer filing for benefits until age 65.
7. Future benefits are discounted by the inflation rate plus a 2 percent 
real objective discount rate. Mortality tables are derived from unpublished data 
supplied by the National Center for Health Statistics, reflecting the most recent 
life tables available.
8. A detailed discussion of the methodology appears in Fields and Mitchell 
(1984).
